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Westenberg: Comment--Establishing the Nexus

ESTABLISHING THE NEXUS: THE DEFINITIVE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CHILD MOLESTATION AND POSSESSION OF CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY AS THE SOLE BASIS FOR PROBABLE CAUSE
Megan Westenberg*

I. INTRODUCTION
Child sexual offenders often sexually exploit children through the
collection, creation, or distribution of child pornography. Up to one
quarter of child molesters collect child pornography.1 This number
increases each day as the Internet continues to make collection of child
pornography more readily accessible.
Accordingly, “[c]hild
pornography, especially that produced by the offender, is one of the
most valuable pieces of evidence of child sexual victimization any
investigator can have.”2
In the last half decade, federal courts of appeals have issued a handful
of conflicting opinions as to whether evidence of child molestation,
alone, creates probable cause for a search warrant for child pornography.
Part II of this Comment paves a background of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence necessary for this discussion. Part II also elucidates two
lines of cases that address the foregoing issue. First, one circuit, as well
as concurring and dissenting judges in other circuits, have concluded
that given the intuitive relationship between child molestation and child
pornography, evidence of child molestation is sufficient probable cause
for a search for child pornography. Second, other circuits have split
with the foregoing interpretation and have held that, because child
molestation and possession of child pornography are separate, distinct
crimes, evidence of one cannot be used as the sole probable cause to
acquire a search warrant for the other.
Part III examines the innate and definitive relationship between child
molestation and child pornography. With support from recent studies
and other scholarly and governmental sources, Part III argues that child
sexual offenders possess the means and predisposition to possess child
pornography. Accordingly, in applying a fluid concept of probable
* Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. KENNETH V. LANNING, NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILD
MOLESTERS:
A
BEHAVIORAL
ANALYSIS
108
(5th
ed.
2010),
available
at
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC70.pdf [hereinafter Lanning, Child Molesters]. In
the inverse, a collection of studies reveals that about 20% of child pornography collectors molest
children. Id. Lanning reconciles these low numbers by concluding that many investigations of child
molestation do not pursue the possibility of child pornography collection—precisely the topic of this
Comment. See id.
2. Id. at 59.
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cause, the narrow connection between the two crimes allows evidence or
an affirmed incidence of child molestation to be adequate probable
cause for a warrant to search for child pornography. An affidavit read in
its totality and in a common sense manner justifies the search and
reinforces the need to combat child sexual exploitation. Finally, Part IV
concludes that because studies have shown a definitive correlation
between child molestation and a child molester’s possession of child
pornography, evidence of child molestation behavior should serve as an
adequate basis for a warrant to search for child pornography.
II. BACKGROUND
A brief overview of the Fourth Amendment and cases pertinent to this
Comment is warranted. Accordingly, Subpart A of this Part discusses
the Fourth Amendment and the basis for probable cause. Subpart B
addresses a brief history of the criminalization of child pornography.
Finally, Subparts C and D examine the dichotomous opinions that
address whether child molestation can be the sole probable cause basis
for a search for child pornography.
A. The Fourth Amendment and Probable Cause Standard
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits
“unreasonable searches and seizures” and requires that “no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.”3 The first step in the warrant application process is
for the investigating law enforcement officer to prepare an application to
be submitted to a magistrate judge. To be valid, “a warrant application
must demonstrate probable cause to believe that (1) a crime has been
committed” (the “commission” element), “and (2) enumerated evidence
of the offense will be found at the place to be searched” (the so-called
“nexus” element).4 The law enforcement officer then drafts an affidavit
in which, under oath or by affirmation, the officer sets out the facts that
he believes justifies the warrant. A magistrate judge then examines the
affidavit and, if the affidavit is approved, issues the search warrant.
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment invokes the
exclusionary rule, whereby evidence collected in violation of one’s
constitutional rights generally becomes inadmissible in a criminal
proceeding.5 However, in United States v. Leon,6 the Supreme Court
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. E.g., United States v. Ribeiro, 397 F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 2005).
5. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
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held that the exclusionary rule barring illegally obtained evidence from
the courtroom does not apply to evidence seized in objectively
reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral
magistrate judge, even where the warrant is later found to be invalid.7
Illinois v. Gates8 is the leading case for determining whether or when
probable cause exists. There, the Supreme Court declared that probable
cause “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal
activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”9 Given that affidavits
are usually drafted by law enforcement officers in the midst of a
criminal investigation, the Court found that the need for an immediate
warrant does not require elaborate technicality or specificity within the
affidavit.10 Thus, the magistrate issuing the warrant must use mere
common sense to determine whether, given the totality of the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a mild probability that
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.11 Ultimately, so
long as the magistrate possessed a “‘substantial basis
for . . . [concluding]’ that a search would uncover evidence of
wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more.”12
B. The Criminalization of Child Pornography
The Supreme Court has long recognized the compelling and
legitimate interest in protecting the psychological, emotional, and
physical development of children from the harmful effects of child
pornography. To illustrate, in New York v. Ferber,13 the Supreme Court
held that the distribution and sale of even non-obscene child
pornography could be criminalized because, inter alia, “a [s]tate’s
interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a
909–10 (1984) (noting that the rule applies “only where it result[s] in appreciable deterrence” and, even
when it results in deterrence, the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs).
6. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
7. Id. at 922. The Court reasoned that, “even assuming that the [exclusionary] rule effectively
deters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the law enforcement profession as a whole to
conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and should not be applied,
to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.” Id. at 918–19. Accordingly, so long as
evidence is obtained with a reasonable reliance on a magistrate-issued warrant, evidence will be
admissible notwithstanding whether or not the search violated one’s privacy rights. See id. at 922. This
is known as the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.
8. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
9. Id. at 244 n.13.
10. Id. at 235.
11. Id. at 238. The magistrate’s determination of probable cause should be paid great deference.
United States v. Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410, 419 (1969)).
12. Gates, 462 U.S. at 246 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).
13. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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minor’ is compelling.”14 Moreover, in Osborne v. Ohio,15 the Court
upheld criminal sanctions for the private possession of child
pornography.16
Whether the criminalization of child pornography conflicts with First
Amendment jurisprudence is outside the scope of this Comment.17
Rather, this Comment seeks to show that because there is such an
instinctive and definitive relationship between child molestation and
possession of child pornography, evidence of the former is an adequate
basis for probable cause for a search warrant for the latter. That the
Supreme Court has long recognized the repugnance and criminality of
child pornography suggests that states and their law enforcement
officers must strive to achieve the compelling interest of protecting the
safety and physical and psychological well-being of children.
C. The Holding in United States v. Colbert18 that Child Molestation
Creates Probable Cause for a Search for Child Pornography
In United States v. Colbert, the Eighth Circuit found that a
commonsense link between child molestation and child pornography
exists such that evidence of the former suffices as probable cause for the
latter.19 The court reasoned that “[t]here is an intuitive relationship
between acts such as child molestation or enticement and possession of
child pornography.”20
In this case, detectives investigated a complaint of suspicious activity
when the defendant was seen pushing a young girl on a swing and
talking about certain “videos” he had at home for her to watch.21 While
detectives questioned the defendant, other law enforcement officers
drafted an affidavit to search for child pornography in the defendant’s
home, primarily because he “attempted to lure a five year old female to
go to his apartment.”22 The district judge issued the warrant.23 Upon
14. Id. at 756–57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
15. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
16. Id. at 111. The current statute criminalizing possession of child pornography is 18 U.S.C.
§ 1466A (2006).
17. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that, in criminalizing possession of child pornography,
the Supreme Court justified its departures from its First Amendment jurisprudence on the grounds that
images of child pornography are the product of child sex abuse, that the state has an important interest in
protecting the victims of child sex abuse, and that reducing demand for child pornography by
prosecuting possessors of child pornography could thus reduce the instances of child sex abuse.
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 130–32.
18. 605 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1469 (2011).
19. Id. at 576–77.
20. Id. at 578.
21. Id. at 575.
22. Id.
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searching, law enforcement officers uncovered numerous computer
discs containing child pornography.24 The district court found the
warrant was supported with ample probable cause to uncover child
pornography because “individuals sexually interested in children
frequently utilize child pornography to reduce the inhibitions of their
victims.”25
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that “sexual depictions of
minors could be logically related to the crime of child enticement.”26
Further, the Eighth Circuit awarded deference to the district judge who
issued the warrant, concluding that it was reasonable for him to believe
that the defendant was enticing the young child to come back to his
house to watch “videos,” thereby establishing a reasonable link between
potential child molestation and possession of child pornography.27
The Eighth Circuit rejected other circuits’ conclusions that there is a
categorical distinction between child pornography and other types of
sexual exploitation of children, such as child molestation.28 Instead, it
found that “that distinction seems to be in tension both with common
experience and a fluid, non-technical conception of probable cause.”29
The court then illustrated the link between child pornography and child
molestation, emphasizing that suspicion of child molestation suffices as
probable cause for child pornography partly because computers have
been increasingly characterized as “tools of the trade for those who
sexually prey on children.”30 The court continued:
For individuals seeking to obtain sexual gratification by abusing children,
possession of child pornography may very well be a logical precursor to
physical interaction with a child: the relative ease with which child
23. Id. at 576.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 577.
26. Id. Judges in other circuits have reached similar conclusions. See United States v. Falso,
544 F.3d 110, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (Livingston, J., concurring) (in finding ample probable cause, Judge
Livingston reasoned that, since child porn is often used to entice young victims, “a person of reasonable
caution would take into account predilections revealed by past crimes or convictions as part of the
inquiry into probable cause.” (quoting United States v. Wagers, 452 F.3d 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2006)));
United States v. Adkins, 169 Fed. App’x 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 854 (2006),
549 U.S. 856 (2006) (since preferential offenders, meaning those whose sexual gratifications focus
exclusively on children, devote a lot of time, money, and energy to the pursuit of child pornography or
sexual contact with children, evidence that one is a preferential offender will generally constitute
probable cause for child pornography).
27. Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578–79.
28. Id. at 578.
29. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–32 (1983)). The court continued: “[e]vidence
adduced to support probable cause must be ‘weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.’” Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232).
30. Id.; See also, e.g., United States v. Paton, 535 F.3d 829, 836 (8th Cir. 2008) (reaching a
similar conclusion).
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pornography may be obtained on the internet might make it a simpler and
less detectable way of satisfying pedophilic desires.31

Because child pornography is often an “electronic record of child
molestation,”32 then “common sense would indicate that a person who is
sexually interested in children is likely to also be inclined, i.e.,
predisposed, to order and receive child pornography.”33
D. Opinions Holding that Child Molestation Does Not Create Probable
Cause to Search for Child Pornography
Most recently, the Third Circuit has split with the Eighth Circuit and
concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not allow evidence of child
sexual abuse to confer probable cause for a search for child
pornography.34 In Virgin Islands v. John, allegations that the defendant,
a middle school teacher, sexually abused many of his young female
students at school were “not sufficient to establish—or even to hint at—
probable cause as to the wholly separate crime of possessing child
pornography.”35 Nor did the good faith exception apply.36 The majority
reasoned that because the question of whether there exists a child sexual
assault–pornography correlation is “one that can be resolved only
through the evaluation of evidence, it must be alleged on the face of the
affidavit in order to be considered for purposes of determining probable
cause.”37 Thus, the court hinted that evidence of child molestation
might, in some cases, be sufficient probable cause for child
pornography. Given that a court “demand[s] nothing more than that an
officer seeking a warrant explain why she is justified in entering a
person’s home and searching through his belongings,”38 perhaps a more
31. Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing United States v. Byrd, 31 F.3d 1329, 1339 (5th Cir. 1994)). Judge Gibson
dissented in Colbert. Judge Gibson maintained that, “[p]erhaps it is true that all or most people who are
attracted to minors collect child pornography . . . [however,] an individual’s Fourth Amendment right
cannot be vitiated based on fallacious inferences drawn from facts not supported by the affidavit.” Id. at
579 (Gibson, J., dissenting). Judge Gibson concluded that, even if a relationship exists between child
enticement and child pornography, “it was unreasonable for the magistrate judge . . . to infer such a
nexus without further evidence to support that inference.” Id. at 580–81. Thus, for Judge Gibson, an
affidavit that explicitly explained the nexus between child molestation and possession of child
pornography may have proven sufficient to support probable cause. See infra notes 37–39 and
accompanying text and note 121.
34. V.I. v. John, 654 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2011).
35. Id. at 419. In this case, although no child pornography was found at the defendant’s home
during the search, evidence was seized that would support charges of rape, unlawful sexual conduct,
child abuse and child neglect. Id. at 414.
36. Id. at 413; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
37. V.I, 654 F.3d at 419.
38. Id. at 420.
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detailed affidavit explaining why a teacher who had been repeatedly
accused of sexually molesting his students would possess child
pornography would have sufficed.39
Judge Fuentes wrote a strongly worded dissent, asserting first that the
majority should have applied the good faith exception.40 Judge Fuentes
wrote that suppressing the evidence “offends basic concepts of the
criminal justice system,”41 and that “‘suppression would do nothing to
deter police misconduct in these circumstances . . . because it would
come at a high cost to both the truth and the public safety.’”42 Judge
Fuentes maintained that given the circuit split and differing expert
opinions, it was not unreasonable for the investigating officer to deem
that probable cause to search for evidence of child molestation provided
probable cause to search for child pornography.43 He further avowed
that it was reasonable for the investigating officer to believe that “there
was a fair probability that a man accused of molesting children and
recording his crimes in one medium—a written journal—might also
record them in another—photographs.”44 Judge Fuentes concluded by
reiterating the progeny of Illinois v. Gates:
[E]vidence must be “seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by
scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law
enforcement . . . [P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”45

Similarly, in Dougherty v. Covina,46 a Ninth Circuit case, the
39. That is, would have sufficed to the majority panel of the Third Circuit in Virgin Islands.
That the judiciary here was so lenient with this defendant is appalling. Given that there exists a
common sense possibility that the teacher—an affirmed molester—would document his fantasies and
encounters with children and utilize child pornography to drive and supplement his molestations, it was
not unreasonable for the magistrate issuing the affidavit, or the law enforcement officers executing the
search, to reason that a child molester would possess child pornography.
40. See id. at 423 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984)).
42. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011)).
43. V.I, 654 F.3d at 425–26. Judge Fuentes continued:
While [a well-trained] officer would have the benefit of several court of appeals opinions
discussing the issue of whether probable cause to believe that someone has molested a
child automatically provides probable cause to believe that someone will possess
photographic evidence of that crime (or photos used to facilitate the crime—tools of a
despicable trade), those opinions provide conflicting guidance.
Id. at 425.
44. Id. at 426.
45. V.I, 654 F.3d at 426 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232
(1983)).
46. 654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011).
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defendant, a middle school teacher, was accused several times of
looking up the skirts and down the shirts of female students in his sixth
grade classroom.47 In the affidavit for a search warrant, the drafting
investigator, a Sex Crimes and Juvenile Detective, requested a warrant
to search for child pornography because, based upon his training and
experience in child sex crimes, he knew subjects involved in this type of
criminal behavior tend to possess child pornography.48 Despite the
investigator’s extensive training and expertise in child sex crimes, the
court held that “the affidavit contain[ed] no facts tying the acts of [the
defendant] as a possible child molester to his possession of child
pornography.”49 The court concluded that, while the “totality of the
circumstances” could allow a court to find probable cause to search for
child pornography, here, the investigator’s “conclusory statement tying
this ‘subject,’ alleged to have molested two children and looked
inappropriately at others, to ‘having in [his] possession child
pornography’ [was] insufficient to create probable cause.”50
Judge Brewster, concurring in Dougherty, found that there was
adequate probable cause to issue a search warrant for child
pornography.51 In agreeing with the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Colbert,
47. Id. at 896. The Assistant Superintendent of the school investigated the allegations, and her
report yielded that Dougherty had inappropriately touched the bra straps of several girls in his
classroom. Id. These accusations were corroborated. Id. Another student recalled Dougherty touching
her bare breast while they were alone in the classroom, with Dougherty calling her a “special girl.” Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 898. Although no child pornography was found during the search of the defendant’s
home, id., that does not underscore the fact that child molesters often possess child pornography. The
investigator in this case based his assessment on a fourteen-year career devoted to investigating child
sex crimes, id. at 896, so it was reasonable for him to purport that the defendant likely possessed child
pornography. Moreover, the context of the allegations against the defendant cannot be disregarded. He
was a teacher of a sixth grade classroom, and several female students said that the defendant had
touched them in inappropriate ways. Id. Thus, this is not a simple case of a one-time child molester
who may or may not continue his pattern of behavior in the future. The defendant spent several hours,
five days a week, with young girls in his classroom. That he had continually been accused of
inappropriately touching his female students, id., should send a red flag to the judiciary that his
continual worshiping of sexual gratification of children could translate into him having documented
these encounters or sexual gratifications at home. Likewise, it would not be unreasonable for an
investigator or law enforcement officer to determine that a child molester would possess child
pornography along with his documentation of his sexual encounters with and sexual fantasies of
children. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.
50. Id. at 899. Perhaps the officer needed to make a more detailed connection between the
defendant’s inappropriate behavior and his likelihood of possessing child pornography in order for the
court to find probable cause. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text and infra note 121. This is
because, in the Ninth Circuit, a magistrate must keep in mind that “all data necessary to show probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant must be contained within the four corners of a written
affidavit given under oath.” United States v. Anderson, 453 F.2d 174, 175 (9th Cir. 1971).
51. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 901 (Brewster, J., concurring). Judge Brewster’s opinion reads more
like a dissent for purposes of this Comment, but his concurrence was based on the fact that he agreed
that the police officers in this case were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 902. Thus, while Judge
Brewster completely disagrees with the majority’s probable cause analysis, he was nonetheless
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Judge Brewster found that “it is a common sense leap that an adult male,
who teaches sixth graders, engaged in this type of inappropriate conduct
[and] would likely possess child pornography.”52 In awarding deference
to the magistrate judge and experience and training of the investigating
officer, Judge Brewster reasoned that the defendant’s pattern of
affirmative and inappropriate misconduct with several sixth grade
students is “closely related to an interest in looking at sexual images of
minors.”53 The facts suggested to the investigating officer, a highly
trained and experienced Sex Crimes and Juvenile Detective, that a
potential child predator had moved “along the continuum of looking and
into the realm of touching.”54
Further, the Sixth Circuit refused to apply the good faith exception in
United States v. Hodson.55 The court reasoned that a well-trained law
enforcement officer in the field, upon looking at the warrant authorizing
a search of the defendant’s residence and computers for child
pornography images, would have realized a disconnect between the
probable cause and crime described.56 Specifically, a law enforcement
officer would have realized that the search for evidence of the crime of
child pornography described in the warrant did not match the probable
cause described, which was that evidence would be found of a different
crime, that of child molestation.57 Noteworthy, however, is the court’s
indication that a more specific affidavit, explicitly showing a relation or
nexus between child molestation and child pornography, may have been
sufficient to issue the warrant based on probable cause.58 The court
reasoned that, since magistrates are not equipped to deduce “an
empirical link between sexual deviance, or even sexual attraction, and
pornography possession,” the affidavit must be supported with expert
analysis linking the two together.59 Because standing alone, a “high
compelled to concur rather than dissent. See id.
52. Id. at 901.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 901–02. Judge Brewster also added that the defendant’s “active misconduct
distinguishes his case from the cases involving defendants who may have passively received unsolicited
child pornography.” Id. at 902.
55. 543 F.3d 286, 293 (6th Cir. 2008).
56. See id. at 289.
57. See id.; But see United States v. Haynes, 160 Fed. App’x 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2005) (court
applied the good faith exception because “common sense dictates that there is a reasonable probability
that an adult male who has expressed an interest in engaging in sexual activity with a minor . . . would
possess child pornography or child erotica.”).
58. Hodson, 543 F.3d at 290; see also supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. For instance,
it would be reasonable for the officers executing a search warrant to believe that a suspected child
molester would possess child pornography and that one’s suspected status as a child molester could be
probable cause for seizing the child pornography. See Haynes, 160 Fed. App’x at 944 (basing analysis
on United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)).
59. Hodson, 543 F.3d at 291.
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incidence of child molestation by persons convicted of child
pornography crimes may not demonstrate that a child molester is likely
to possess child pornography,” a request for a warrant must explicitly
spell out—with evidence—an inference to support the nexus.60
III. DISCUSSION
Since Colbert,61 federal courts have curtailed the allowance of
investigators and law enforcement officers to seize child pornography
when searching for evidence of child molestation. Whether it is due to a
tightening of Fourth Amendment rights, a bolstering of Due Process
rights, or a decline in the “crime control” paradigm,62 the judiciary must
reconsider its current path and cease from sacrificing the safety and
well-being of children for a greater allocation of constitutional rights.
Often, seizing child pornography may be the only way to link the
defendant to child molestation.63 If the only documentation that exists is
child pornography of children that he has molested, then seizing the
child pornography is vital for conviction not only of possession of child
pornography but also of the child molestation.64 Given the definitive
relationship between child molestation and child pornography, courts
must stop raising the Fourth Amendment ceiling if they want to alleviate
the sexual exploitation of children.
Part A of this discussion references numerous studies which show a
definitive relationship—and, thus, more than a commonsense nexus—
between child molesters and those who possess child pornography.
Parts B and C explicate the government’s and U.S. Supreme Court’s
recognition of this nexus. Part D concludes that this nexus is definitive
enough to allow probable cause for a search warrant for child
molestation to be adequate probable cause for a search warrant for child
pornography. Finally, Part E proposes a solution that courts should
adhere to when deciding these cases—a solution that harmonizes Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence with the concerns and societal interests in
protecting the safety and well-being of potential child sexual victims.

60. Id. at 293–94; see also supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text; United States v. Falso,
544 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (probable cause for child pornography does not lie where the affidavit
alleged that the defendant had a conviction—eighteen years prior—of sexual abuse on a minor).
61. See supra Part II(C).
62. For the original discussion of the “crime control” paradigm, see Herbert L. Packer, Two
Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964).
63. See infra Part III(A), (B), and (C).
64. See supra notes 2, 29 and accompanying text.
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A. Studies Indicate a Nexus Between Child Molesters and Viewers of
Child Pornography
Since the dawn of the Internet led to a rapid increase in child
pornography, a number of studies have illustrated the link between child
molestation and possession of child pornography.65 For instance, the
Mayo Clinic published studies and case reports which indicated that up
to 80% of individuals who viewed child pornography and 76% of
individuals who were arrested for online child pornography had
molested a child.66
For another example, a widely discussed study recently conducted at
the Federal Corrections Facility in Butner, North Carolina, revealed that
child pornography offenders are almost always child molesters as
well—they were just not caught.67 A shocking 85% of the child

65. See, e.g., Candice Kim, From Fantasy to Reality: The Link Between Viewing Child
Pornography and Molesting Children, 1 CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION PROGRAM UPDATE 1 (2004),
available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Update_gr_vol1_no3.pdf (noting that, of a study based on 1,400
cases of child molestation over a four year period, pornography was connected with every incident of
molestation, and child pornography was used in a majority of those cases); Neil Malamuth & Mark
Huppin, Drawing the Line on Virtual Child Pornography: Bringing the Law in Line with the Research
Evidence, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 773, 794 (2007); but see, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick,
Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 875 (2011)
[hereinafter Hessick, Disentangling] (“empirical literature is unable to validate the assumption that there
is a causal connection between possession of child pornography and child sex abuse.”). While
Hessick’s article asserts there is a lack of causation between the two child sex crimes, this Comment
seeks to show that the mere correlation between child molestation and child pornography is the
determinative factor for a probable cause analysis.
66. Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition, Characteristics of
Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, 82(4) MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS
457, 460 (2007), available at http://www.drryanhall.com/Articles/pedophiles.pdf. However, the authors
note that it is difficult to know how many people progress from computerized child pornography to
physical acts against children and how many would have progressed to physical acts without the
computer being involved. Id.
67. Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The ‘Butner Study’ Redux: A Report of the
Incidence of Hands-On Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE
183, 189 (2009) [hereinafter “Bourke & Hernandez, Butner Study”]; see also Julian Sher & Benedict
Carey, Debate on Child Pornography’s Link to Molesting, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/19/us/19sex.html?pagewanted=all (commentary from the Butner
study’s researchers); Andres E. Hernandez, Position Paper, Psychological and Behavioral
Characteristics
of
Child
Pornography
Offenders
in
Treatment,
(2009),
http://www.iprc.unc.edu/G8/Hernandez_position_paper_Global_Symposium.pdf. The Butner study was
conducted from 2002 to 2005. Bourke & Hernandez, Butner Study, at 186. Even prior to the dot com
boom, child molestation and possession of child pornography went hand-in-hand. See OKLAHOMANS
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, OCAF WHITE PAPER ON INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY 9 (1997), available at
http://walrustalk.com/3/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/agincourt1.pdf (in a 1994 study of convicted child
molesters, 77 percent of those who molested boys and 87 percent of those who molested girls admitted
to the habitual use of pornography in the commission of their crimes). Even more problematic is that
child pornography offenders with a prior history of contact sexual offenses are more likely to sexually
reoffend. Michael C. Seto & Angela W. Eke, The Criminal Histories and Later Offending of Child
Pornography Offenders, 17 SEXUAL ABUSE 201, 207 (2005).
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pornography offenders said they had committed acts of sexual abuse
against minors, which ranged from inappropriate touching to rape.68 Of
the offenders who admitted to molesting children in some way, the
average number of victims per perpetrator was 13.56.69 The chief
psychologist of the study, Michael L. Bourke, stated:
There is this assumption—in the treatment context, in courtrooms, in
investigative circles and in the assessment literature—that [child
pornographer users and child molesters] are dichotomous groups.
However, in the course of treatment, these men would disclose to us that
their use of the Internet was not the limit of their sexual acting out—it
was in fact an adjunctive behavior.70

Although criticism surrounds the study,71 many scholars have concluded
that there exists a complex and reciprocal interaction between viewing
child pornography and perpetrating sexual offenses with children.72
Bourke concluded that although child pornography use and child
molestation were previously “seemingly distinct forms of criminality,”
the study now highlights the co-morbidity and strong relationship
between the two child sexual crimes.73
Furthermore, child molesters use child pornography in at least four
primary ways: (1) to sexually arouse and gratify themselves,74 (2) to
68. Bourke & Hernandez, Butner Study, supra note 67, at 187. Similarly, since child
pornography is often used to entice young victims, “a person of reasonable caution would take into
account predelictions revealed by past crimes or convictions as part of the inquiry into probable cause.”
United States v. Wagers, 452 F.3d 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
69. Bourke & Hernandez, Butner Study, supra note 67, at 187.
70. Tori DeAngelis, Porn Use and Child Abuse, 40 MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY 56, 56 (2009)
(internal quotations omitted), available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/12/child-abuse.aspx.
71. For instance, the head of the Sexual Disorders Clinic at Johns Hopkins felt that the study
would generalize too much and would have conflicting implications for community safety and
individual liberties. See Matt Anderson, Controversial Study Strongly Links Child Porn Use and Child
Abuse,
LIFE
SITE
NEWS,
Dec.
11,
2009,
http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/archive/ldn/2009/dec/09121109; see also Hessick, Disentangling,
supra note 65, at 875 (“empirical literature is unable to validate the assumption that there is a causal
connection between possession of child pornography and child sex abuse”).
72. To illustrate, a longitudinal study of 341 convicted child molesters found that pornography
use correlated significantly with their rate of sexually re-offending. Drew A. Kingston, Paul Fedoroff,
Philip Firestone, Susan Curry, & John M. Bradford, Pornography Use and Sexual Aggression: The
Impact of Frequency and Type of Pornography Use on Recidivism Among Sexual Offenders, 34
AGGRESSIVE
BEHAVIOR
1,
1
(2008),
available
at
http://www.ccoso.org/library%20articles/aggressivebehavior.pdf. Frequency of pornography use was
primarily a further risk factor for higher-risk offenders, or those that show a stronger association
between child pornography and child sexual aggression. Id.
73. See Matt Anderson, Controversial Study Strongly Links Child Porn Use and Child Abuse,
LIFE SITE NEWS, Dec. 11, 2009, http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/archive/ldn/2009/dec/09121109.
74. “Even if some of them never go on to sexually victimize a child, it is reasonable to view and
treat arrested [child pornography] possessors as at high risk for victimizing children.” JANIS WOLAK ET
AL., CHILD-PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS ARRESTED IN INTERNET-RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM
THE
NATIONAL JUVENILE ONLINE VICTIMIZATION STUDY 3 (2005), available at
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lower children’s inhibitions,75 (3) to blackmail the child by seducing
him or her into sexual activity,76 and (4) to allow other offenders access
to other children.77 These uses alone illustrate the link between child
pornography possessors and child molesters. Because possessors of
child pornography often use the pornography as a medium and aid to
sexually prey upon children, there is room for conflicting affirmation in
the argument that child molestation and possession of child pornography
are “separate crimes” not worthy of joint probable cause.
Consequently, the foregoing data cannot be ignored: there exists at
least a general correlation between child molesters and possessors of
child pornography.78 Therefore, crime control must strengthen to seize
child pornography, given that possessors of child pornography utilize
the pornography to entice and sexually exploit children.
B. The Government’s Recognition of the Nexus
Government entities have long recognized the harm of child
pornography and have recently emphasized the link between child
molestation and child pornography.79 In a congressional statement by
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC144.pdf.
75. For example, “individuals sexually interested in children frequently utilize child pornography
to reduce the inhibitions of their victims.” United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1469 (Feb. 22, 2011).
76. Lanning, Child Molesters, supra note 1, at 90; see also Michael Medaris & Cathy Girouard,
Protecting Children in Cyberspace: The ICAC Task Force Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE JUVENILE
JUSTICE BULLETIN, Jan. 2002, at 2 [hereinafter Protecting Children in Cyberspace], available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/191213.pdf (by exposing children to pornographic images of other
victims with the intention of building a sense of comfort and by using pictures of the victim to coerce
them into keeping quiet, offenders are ultimately able to use these pornographic images as a tool to exert
power over their victims).
77. Lanning, Child Molesters, supra note 1, at 90; see also 149 Cong. Rec. S2573, S2584 (daily
ed. Feb. 24, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Congress has long recognized that child pornography
produces three distinct and lasting harms to our children. First, child pornography whets the appetites of
pedophiles and prompts them to act out their perverse sexual fantasies on real children. Second, child
pornography is a tool used by pedophiles to break down the inhibitions of children. Third, child
pornography creates an immeasurable and indelible harm on the children who are abused to manufacture
it.”).
78. See, e.g., Michael C. Seto, James M. Cantor & Ray Blanchard, Child Pornography Offenses
Are a Valid Diagnostic Indicator of Pedophilia, 115 JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 610, 613
(2006) (child abuse image possession may be a “stronger indicator of pedophilia than is [previously]
sexually offending against a child.”); id. at 611 (in one recent study, roughly half of a sample of child
pornography offenders had also been charged with a child sexual offense); Bourke & Hernandez, Butner
Study, supra note 67, at 183 (“Internet offenders in our sample were significantly more likely than not to
have sexually abused a child via a hands-on act.”).
79. See supra note 78; see also Protecting Children in Cyberspace, supra note 76 (strong
anecdotal evidence exists among those involved in prosecuting child pornography cases that there is a
strong correlation between those who collect child pornography and those convicted of child
molestation in seeking out potential victims). Further, the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996,
which has since been repealed on First Amendment grounds, details that Congress finds:
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for instance, a member of the
Crimes Against Children Unit stated that there is “a strong correlation
between child pornography offenders and molesters of children” and
that “the correlation between collection of child pornography and actual
child abuse is too real and too grave to ignore.”80 Similarly, Congress
has found that “child pornography is often used by pedophiles and child
sexual abusers to stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites, and as a
model for sexual acting out with children.”81 For example, one
congressionally-adopted study found that up to 90% of pedophiles
reported using child pornography, often immediately before committing
an act of child molestation.82 Further, “a significant portion of child
pornography offenders have a criminal history that involves the sexual
abuse or exploitation of children . . . .”83 Law enforcement officers have
confirmed to Congress that child sexual predators almost always collect

[C]hild pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing other children into
sexual activity . . . child pornography is often used by pedophiles and child sexual
abusers to stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites, and as a model for sexual
acting out with children; such use of child pornography can desensitize the viewer to the
pathology of sexual abuse or exploitation of children, so that it can become acceptable to
and even preferred by the viewer . . . the existence of and traffic in child pornographic
images creates the potential for many types of harm in the community and presents a
clear and present danger to all children . . . [child pornography] inflames the desires of
child molesters, pedophiles, and child pornographers who prey on children, thereby
increasing the creation and distribution of child pornography and the sexual abuse and
exploitation of actual children who are victimized as a result of the existence and use of
these materials . . . [and] prohibiting the possession and viewing of child pornography
will encourage the possessors of such material to rid themselves of or destroy the
material, thereby helping to protect the victims of child pornography and to eliminate the
market for the sexual exploitative use of children.
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, PUB. L. NO. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–26
(1996) (repealed 2002 on First Amendment grounds).
80. Enhancing Child Protection Laws After the April 16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision,
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Sec. of the Homeland Sec. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Michael J.
Heimbach, Crimes Against Children Unit, Criminal Investigative Div, Fed. Bureau of Investigation),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/heimbach050102.htm; see also United States v. Brand,
467 F.3d 179, 198 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that “possession of child pornography . . . shares a
connection . . . with pedophilia.”).
81. Brand, 467 F.3d at 198; see also David B. Johnson, Why the Possession of ComputerGenerated Child Pornography Can Be Constitutionally Prohibited, 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 311, 327–
28 (1994) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY:
FINAL REPORT 649–50 (1986)) (concluding there is evidence that child pornography may induce
viewers to commit sex crimes on children).
82. See 149 Cong. Rec. H9735 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 2003) (statement of Rep. Osborne).
83. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SEX OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN i (1996),
available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Sex_Offe
nse_Topics/199606_RtC_Sex_Crimes_Against_Children/SCAC_Executive_Summary.htm.
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child pornography or child erotica.84
C. The Supreme Court’s Recognition of the Nexus
The Supreme Court has long recognized the relationship of child
pornography and child molestation.85 As early as 1982, the Supreme
Court, in criminalizing child pornography86 in New York v. Ferber,87
reasoned that child pornography “is intrinsically related to the sexual
abuse of children” because “the materials produced are a permanent
record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is
exacerbated by their circulation.”88 Thus, the Supreme Court “approved
as narrowly tailored the banning of child pornography, including its
possession, in part because of the causal link between child
pornography . . . and the sexual abuse and exploitation of children.”89
Additionally, in United States v. Byrd,90 the Supreme Court, in
finding the defendant’s pedophilic behavior was properly used to show
his predisposition to order and receive child pornography, reasoned:
Pedophiles use child pornography for gratifying their own sexual desires,
reducing the inhibitions of their victims and instructing their victims on
proper sexual performance. In addition to citing the case law and expert
testimony that links pedophilia to child pornography, we also note that
common sense would indicate that a person who is sexually interested in
children is likely to also be inclined, i.e., predisposed, to order and
receive child pornography.91

Finally, that the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in United
States v. Colbert92 ostensibly illustrates that the Court does not wholly
disagree with the Eight Circuit’s conclusion that the link between child

84. United States v. Lebovitz, 401 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting S. REP. NO. 104358, at 12–13 (1996)); see also Lara N. Strayer, Ambiguous Laws Do Little to Erase “Kiddieporn,” 5
TEMP POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 169, 178 (1996) (citing 137 Cong. Rec. S10322-04 at S10323 (daily ed.
July 18, 1991) (statement of Sen. Helms) (police officer estimated that fifty percent of child molesters at
the time of their arrest had in their possession numerous “kiddie-porn” videotapes and magazines)).
While this latter statement is over two decades old, such a trend is nonetheless true—and even more true
today—given the explosion of child pornography on the Internet.
85. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (“evidence suggests that pedophiles use
child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity.”); see also supra notes 13–14 and
accompanying text.
86. See supra Part II(B).
87. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
88. Id. at 759.
89. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 920 (4th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 535 U.S.
1014 (2002).
90. 31 F.3d 1329 (5th Cir. 1994).
91. Id. at 1339.
92. 605 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1469 (Feb. 22, 2011).
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molestation and child pornography allows evidence of child molestation
behavior to serve as an adequate basis for a search warrant for child
pornography.
D. The Nexus in Conjunction with the Fourth Amendment: The
Exclusionary Rule is Meant to be a Rare Exception
In the cases in which defendants have argued that law enforcement
officers infringed upon their constitutional rights in searching for child
pornography when the warrant authorized a search only for evidence of
child molestation, the success of the argument has hinged on the
exclusionary rule.
Specifically, defendants have successfully
suppressed evidence of child pornography because the searches for child
pornography were outside the scope of the search warrants for evidence
of child molestation. Courts’ overuse of the exclusionary rule conflicts
not only with the original intent of the rule,93 but also with public policy
in applying the rule in cases like the ones discussed in this Comment,
where the safety and well-being of children are at stake.
The primary purpose of the judicially created exclusionary rule “is to
deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures[.]”94 However, the exclusionary rule is not intended to prevent
all police misconduct or to be a remedy for all police errors because it is
“an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of
constitutional rights.”95 Accordingly, the exclusionary rule’s application
in the circumstances described by this Comment is, as elucidated below,
misplaced.
A recent Supreme Court case discusses the social costs of the
exclusionary rule that coincide with this Comment; that is, that the
exclusionary rule exists does not mean the judiciary should enforce it
when doing so sacrifices public safety and well-being. The Supreme
Court in Davis v. United States96 emphasized:
Real deterrent value is a necessary condition for exclusion of evidence,
but it is not a sufficient one. The analysis must also account for the
substantial social costs generated by the [exclusionary] rule. Exclusion
exacts a heavy toll on both the judicial system and society at large. It
almost always requires courts to ignore reliable, trustworthy evidence
bearing on guilt or innocence. And its bottom-line effect, in many cases,
is to suppress the truth and set the criminal loose in the community
93.
94.
95.
96.

See infra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 1999).
564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
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without punishment . . . . [S]ociety must swallow this bitter pill when
necessary, but only as a last resort. For exclusion to be appropriate, the
deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs.97

Correspondingly, whatever minimal deterrence effect the
exclusionary rule may possess is outweighed by the need to not let those
who sexually exploit children by means of child molestation or child
pornography go free. If a warrant for a search for evidence of child
molestation is proper, then deterrence will have little impact on a law
enforcement officer searching an alleged child molester’s home for
supplemental evidence of child pornography. Because searches must
only be reasonable,98 it would not be unreasonable for a law
enforcement officer to suspect that a presumed child molester would
document his child sexual encounters in some form of medium on a
computer.99 Nor would it be unreasonable for a law enforcement officer
to suspect that a presumed child molester would have taken pictures of
his encounter and have them loaded to his computer. Nor would it be
unreasonable for a law enforcement officer to suspect that a presumed
child molester would have engaged in online chats in an underage chat
room to search for potential victims.100 In any of these probable
hypothetical situations, it would be reasonable for the law enforcement
officer to conduct his search for child molestation on the computer.101
And, accordingly, there is little—if any—deterrent effect if the law
enforcement officer who, already searching the computer, conducts a
search for child pornography. Ultimately, it would not be unreasonable
for a law enforcement officer—a public servant to her community—to

97. Id. at 2427 (internal citations omitted).
98. See supra Part II(A). Furthermore, the standards for determining probable cause for a search
warrant apply to a search for child pornography on a computer. United States v. Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047,
1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007).
99. For instance, in United States. v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008), the magistrate
issuing the warrant found that the detective’s:
Failure to include her opinion as the critical link to establish probable cause does not
reduce the Affidavit to mere suspicion or belief’ because ‘[t]hese suspected crimes are
not as ‘unrelated’ to child pornography as [the defendant] contends; both the cited
conduct and the sought evidence involve sexual exploitation of minors.
Id. at 291. However, the Sixth Circuit rejected the magistrate’s justification for admitting the child
pornography as evidence. Id. at 292.
100. All of the foregoing examples would be in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1466A, which relates to
prohibiting child pornography, or 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), which prohibits a person from “knowingly
[attempting to] persuade, induce, entice and coerce a minor to engage in prohibited sexual activity. 18
U.S.C. § 1466A (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2006).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 579 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1469 (Feb. 22, 2011) (“even if we were to hold that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause [for a
search for child pornography], suppression of the evidence would not be appropriate because [the
defendant] has not shown that the officers acted unreasonably in carrying out the search.”).
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want to seize a child molester’s child pornography collection to alleviate
the incidence of child sexual exploitation, especially since child sexual
abusers are more likely than others in the general population to possess
child pornography.102
E. Solutions
Given that there is at least an intuitive relationship between child
molestation and possession of child pornography, both law enforcement
officers and the judiciary cannot ignore that relationship when
determining whether probable cause for a search warrant for child
pornography exists on the basis of child molestation. First, a fluid
probable cause standard, coupled with the expertise of the investigating
officer and deference to the magistrate, will prove sufficient to authorize
a valid search warrant. Likewise, a detailed affidavit that explicitly
explains the connection between child pornography and child
molestation will also prove sufficient to authorize a valid search
warrant. Conversely, if a magistrate finds a detailed affidavit drafted by
the investigating officer insufficient, then expert analyses cited within
the affidavit, corroborating the nexus between child pornography and
child molestation, will also be enough to validate a search warrant.
Finally, if a magistrate refuses to authorize a search warrant
notwithstanding the foregoing solutions and notwithstanding the
definitive relationship between child molestation and possession of child
pornography, then the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment
will prohibit suppression of child pornography evidence because
suppression would impose great societal costs and would prove
counterproductive in the effort to combat child sexual exploitation. The
foregoing solutions are examined in depth below.
1. Fluid, Non-Technical Probable Cause Standard and Deference to
Investigators
Probable cause for a search exists when the facts and circumstances
within an officer’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably
trustworthy information, convince the officer to believe that sufficient
evidence will be found in the place to be searched.103 Further, neither
“certainty nor a preponderance of the evidence is required[,]” but rather
102. See, e.g., United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 198 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, PUB. L. NO. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–26 (1996)
(repealed 2002 on First Amendment grounds)).
103. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
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a “fair probability” that the evidence will be found is sufficient.104 Thus,
there need not be direct evidence of solicitation of child pornography to
create probable cause.105
Moreover, in determining whether there is a fair probability that
evidence will be found in a particular place, the experience and training
of the investigating officer should be taken into consideration. Evidence
must be “seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars,
but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”106
Probable cause is thus a fluid concept that depends on the probabilities
in particular factual contexts.107 The factual determinations made by
investigators in the field need not be correct, they just must be
reasonable.108 Accordingly, law enforcement officers who have worked
for years in combating child molestation and child pornography have
seen the link between the two crimes first-hand. Great deference should
be awarded to the initial, on-the-scene determination that probable cause
has been established.109 Likewise, notwithstanding the expertise of the
investigating officer, the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment search
warrant cannot be forgotten: deference to the magistrate.110 It is not
wholly unreasonable for a magistrate judge to assume that probable
cause based on sexual activity with a minor would support a search for
child pornography.111 A combination of the investigating officer’s
specialized experience in child exploitation crimes, coupled with a
magistrate’s legal knowledge of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
provides an adequate basis to search for child pornography on the basis
of child molestation suspicions.112

104. United States v. Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 246 (1983)).
105. Id. at 1055.
106. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
107. Kelley, 482 F.3d at 1050.
108. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1990).
109. See United States v. Maxim, 55 F.3d 394, 397 (8th Cir. 1995).
110. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
111. United States v. Baker, 2:04-CR-00427-RCJ-RJJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58021, at *14–15
(D. Nev. Aug. 3, 2006), aff’d, 281 Fed. App’x 705 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Tex. v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 742 (1983) (the probable cause standard does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct
or more likely true than false).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Lebovitz, 401 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[l]aw
enforcement investigations have verified that pedophiles almost always collect child pornography or
child erotica.”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 12–13 (1996)). For instance, in United States v.
Burdulis, No. 10-40003-FDS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53612 (D. Mass. May 19, 2011), the court found
that the affidavit contained a sufficient “nexus”; specifically, “the affidavit provided sufficient
information to infer a rational nexus between the enumerated crimes and ‘pornographic materials,’
including . . . child pornography.” Id. at *31–32. Thus the court denied the defendant’s motion to
suppress the seizure of child pornography. Id. at *49; see also United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d
1263, 1267, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006) (warrant authorizing search for child pornography as evidence of
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Additionally, courts may also apply a “sliding scale” to probable
cause determinations. Under a sliding scale approach, the degree of
suspicion required to constitute probable cause would depend on the
individual and societal interests implicated in the specific case.113 Here,
as elucidated above, the public interests in the safety and well-being of
children are beyond compelling. However, this is not to say that
someone has limited Fourth Amendment protection merely because
society has an interest in assuring that children are not exposed to child
sexual exploitation. Rather, law enforcement officers and child sex
crimes investigators will, under this approach, be able to link the crimes
of child pornography possession and child molestation together in a
more direct manner. For example, assume a man is suspected of
molesting children and such accusations have been corroborated by his
victims. Such accusations would impact the man’s individual interests.
However, the societal interests of the safety and well-being of
children—especially the man’s victims—would significantly outweigh
any of his individual interests.
Accordingly, the corroborated
accusations of repeated child molestation behavior could serve as
adequate probable cause for a search not only for evidence of the child
molestation, but also child pornography, given the definitive relationship
between the two.
Likewise, without discussion of the good faith exception at this
point,114 some of the federal courts of appeals’ decisions suggest that the
“totality of the circumstances” paradigm could, in some instances, allow
courts to find probable cause to search for child pornography.115 For
instance, the Ninth Circuit suggested that, if there is evidence that an
alleged child molester had actually enticed a child to come into his
apartment, then probable cause for child pornography would also lie,
given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search.116
crime of “sexual exploitation of a child” was valid).
113. See United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1197 (7th Cir. 1990) (favoring a sliding-scale
approach, the court observed that “circumstances defy . . . simple categorization, and if a [probable
cause] line must . . . be drawn it will be arbitrary, with nearly identical cases on opposite sides.”); see
also Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” versus “Standardized Procedures”: The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141 (1974) (preference for sliding-scale approach because
a “highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing
of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions” would be unfeasible).
114. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court
merely requires that an affidavit be read in its totality and in a commonsense manner. See Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231–32 (1983); see also United States v. Syphers, 426 F.3d 461, 465 (1st Cir.
2005) (“[s]earch warrants and affidavits should be considered in a common sense manner, and hypertechnical readings should be avoided.”) (quoting United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 868 (1st Cir.
1986)).
116. See Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 899; see also United States v. McBurnette, 382 Fed. App’x 813,
815 (11th Cir. 2010) (in finding the affidavit for search warrant not stale, the court reasoned that the
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Moreover, at least for cases like Dougherty and John,117 it is a common
sense leap that an adult male, a teacher who has been accused of
inappropriately touching his female students on several occasions,
would likely possess child pornography.118 Ultimately, the nexus
element can and should “be inferred from the type of crime, the nature
of the items sought, the extent of an opportunity for concealment and
normal inferences as to where a criminal would hide evidence of the
crime in question.”119 However, for the courts that will not jump to such
a nexus based on inferences, perhaps a more detailed affidavit that
explicitly clarifies the connection between child pornography and child
molestation would suffice.120 Because such a definitive relationship
exists,121 an extra step in the application for a warrant process could
prove crucial in prosecuting those who prey on children with both child
molestation and possession of child pornography.
2. The Use of Experts to Corroborate the “Nexus”
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, if a court finds that standing
alone, a high incidence of child molestation does not demonstrate
probable cause for a search for child molestation, then use of expert
analysis to draw the nexus will suffice.122 The use of an expert might
also be necessary in cases where the warrant was based on the law
enforcement officer’s experience in child sexual crimes; specifically,
since the Fourth Amendment requires an objective reasonableness
victim detailed incidents that occurred two years prior, including incidents that the defendant made her
watch child pornography with him and that the officers—with their knowledge that pedophiles never
dispose of their child pornography—had reason to believe that the pornography would still be in the
house even though the sexual molestation occurred two years prior).
117. See supra Part II(D).
118. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text; see also Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 901
(Brewster, J., concurring); United States v. Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007).
119. United States v. Walker, 145 Fed. App’x 552, 555 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v.
Charest, 602 F.2d 1015, 1017 (1st Cir. 1979)).
120. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text; see also V.I. v. John, 654 F.3d 412, 419 (3d
Cir. 2011) (“Because the question is one that can be resolved only through the evaluation of evidence, it
must be alleged on the face of the affidavit in order to be considered for purposes of determining
probable cause.”); United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (given that child molestation
and child pornography are separate offenses, the affidavit must draw a correlation between a person’s
propensity to commit both types of crimes for the search warrant to cover a search for child
pornography); Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 898 (the affidavit must contain facts tying a defendant as a
possible child molester to his possession of child pornography); United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286,
289 (6th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that if the affidavit for a warrant established, alleged, or suggested that
the defendant, a purported child molester, would be involved with child pornography, then the nexus
will be seen by the magistrate and thus probable cause will lie for a search for child pornography).
121. See supra Part III(A).
122. See, e.g., Hodson, 543 F.3d at 289 (suggesting that expert testimony of a relational nexus
between child molestation and child pornography could establish probable cause).
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standard, a law enforcement officer’s subjective expertise may not be
enough. For instance, in United States v. Adkins,123 the court found that:
[An] affidavit [that] set[s] forth other information on the likelihood of a
molester’s possessing pornography, namely the FBI’s “institutional
knowledge,” [will suffice] . . . . This “institutional knowledge” included
the information that preferential offenders devote time, money, and
energy to the pursuit of child pornography or sexual contact with
children; that they typically keep collections of child pornography or
“child erotica”; and that they have well-developed techniques for gaining
access to child pornography or child victims. This information, in
conjunction with [the officer’s] determination that [the defendant] is a
preferential offender, supports a finding that [the defendant] was
reasonably likely to possess child pornography.124

Since magistrates often cannot deduce the definitive link between
child molestation and possession of child pornography, a warrant under
these circumstances must also contain an expert’s analysis. Specifically,
given the instinctive and now definitively confirmed relationship
between the two crimes, probable cause for a search for evidence of
child molestation will equally suffice as probable cause for a search for
possession of child pornography.
3. The Good Faith Exception125
Although the preceding solution is the ideal one given the definitive
relationship between child molestation and possession of child
pornography, a discussion of invoking the good faith exception is
warranted. Consequently, the failure to state explicitly the connection
between child molestation and child pornography in an affidavit does
not support a contention that the law enforcement officers were
unreasonable or grossly negligent as to warrant exclusion of evidence.
For example, even the Second Circuit, which found the connection
between child molestation and child pornography to be nothing more
than an “inferential fallacy of ancient standing,”126 could not come to the
conclusion that a police officer acting on a warrant based on such an
assumption was entirely unreasonable.127 Excluding evidence where the
law enforcement officers did not act recklessly or with gross negligence,
such as excluding the evidence in child pornography cases, would
impose great costs and would “offend[] basic concepts of the criminal
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

169 Fed. App’x 961 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 854 (2006), 549 U.S. 856 (2006).
Id. at 967.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2008).
See id. at 125–28.
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justice system.”128 Suppression is necessary “only if the officers were
dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable
cause.”129 None of the cases discussed in this Comment indicate that the
investigating officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their
affidavits. Accordingly, in the very least, the good faith exception
should have been applied in each case to keep the evidence of child
pornography from being suppressed.
Likewise, if an affidavit that states, for example, that “individuals
who exploit children use computers to locate, view, download, collect
and organize images of child pornography found through the Internet,”
and that connection is substantiated by a citation to studies outlining the
definitive relationship between child molestation and possession of child
pornography, then it would not be unreasonable for a law enforcement
officer executing the search with a warrant based on that affidavit to
reasonably believe that inference to be true. Similarly, it would not be
unreasonable for an officer executing a search warrant based on an
affidavit that explicitly states, with supportive expert data, that the
defendant’s “contemporaneous attempt[s]” to molest children
predisposes him to possess child pornography, to assume that the child
molester indeed likely possesses child pornography.130 And again, there
must only be a “fair probability”131—not a substantial or significant
likelihood—that the child pornography will be found. Consequently, so
long as the officers deem there is a fair probability that child
pornography will be found in the home of a suspected child molester,
then no Fourth Amendment rights will be violated.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that “[t]he good faith exception may
be applied to a search conducted pursuant to an overly broad
warrant.”132 As a result, an overly broad search warrant for a search for

128. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984); see also V.I. v. John, 654 F.3d 412, 417 (3d
Cir. 2011) (“Suppression of valuable evidence imposes social costs by hindering the courts’ truthseeking function . . . .”).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984)).
130. United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1469
(2011). Further:
If even the experts cannot agree on whether probable cause to search for evidence of
child molestation provides probable cause to search for child pornography, it [is] not
objectively unreasonable—let alone, entirely unreasonable—for [the detective drafting
the affidavit] to take one side of the controversy over the other . . . .
V.I. v. John, 654 F.3d at 425 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
131. United States v. Kelley, 482 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 246 (1983)).
132. United States v. Travers, 233 F.3d 1327, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v.
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child pornography, when supported only by facts of child molestation,
might nonetheless be a “reasonable” search and seizure if the officer
executing the search acted reasonably and in a good faith reliance on the
facts of the affidavit.133 Such a reliance on the affidavit would be more
than a mere “unsupported hunch[]” in which officers base their warrant
assessment on unexamined biases and stereotypes.134 Rather, the
officers would conscientiously assess the facts supporting the affidavit
and, with their expertise in child exploitation crimes and reasonable
reliance on the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant, the search
would be deemed “reasonable” based on the good faith exception.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of Colbert,135 other similar cases, and the dissents and
concurrences in opinions opposing the Colbert decision,136 there exists
at least a commonsense link between child molestation and possession
of child pornography. Moreover, recent studies now also illustrate a
definitive relationship between child molestation and a molester’s
collection of child pornography. Accordingly, given this established
relationship, evidence of child molestation behavior should confer
probable cause for a warrant to search for child pornography. The
substantiated link between these two child sexual exploitative crimes
elucidated in the recent studies will now serve as a source for
investigators who ask a magistrate judge to authorize a search warrant
for child pornography. The link will also serve as an affirmation to
judges during suppression hearings who will now be able to rely on such
studies without fear of trampling on the Fourth Amendment.
Ultimately, now that the relationship between child molestation and
possession of child pornography has been definitively established, the
judiciary will be more adept to serve society’s interests in combating the
pervasiveness of child sexual exploitative crimes.

Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477, 1481 (11th Cir. 1985)).
133. “[A]pplicable precedent requires us to determine the culpability of a police officer’s conduct
in an objective fashion, asking whether ‘a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the
search was illegal in light of all the circumstances.’” John, 654 F.3d at 424 (quoting United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984)).
134. Id. at 421.
135. See supra Part II(C).
136. See supra Part II(D).
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